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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAMUEL ~\D.AMS and 
HILDA M. ~\D:\MS, his \Vife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DON A. TAYLOR and 
MILDRED B. TAYLOR, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case' No. 
9986 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Second District Court 
for Davis County 
HONORABLE THORNLEY K. SWAN, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer action by which respond-
ents seek restitution of premises and treble damages 
against appellants and in which appellants counter-claim 
for specific performance of a verbal lease and option to 
purchase. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied respondents any relief, and 
granted appellants' prayer for specific performance of the 
verbal lease, but denied appellants' prayer for specific 
performance of the verbal option to purchase. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's denial of 
specific performance of the option to purchase. 
ST A TE.MENT OF FACTS 
In December, 1958, the appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Tay-
lor, approached respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Adams, about 
leasing or buying from the Adamses a parcel of ground 
fronting on U. S. Highway 91 north of the City of Layton 
for an A & W drive-in restaurant (T. 4, 23, 61). There was 
on existing building on the parcel in question, but it was 
run-down and unsuited for use as a drive-in, having been 
condemned by the Davis County Health Department (T. 
104, 105). The Taylors took a picture of the premises and 
submitted it to the A & W national organization (T. 4, 6, 23, 
62), and the national organization approved it, subject to 
the making of certain specified changes (T. 6, 7, 62). The 
'raylors requested the Adamses to make the necessary im-
provements to the premises at the Adamses' expense and 
recover their money through a higher rent, but the Ad-
amses declined and said the Taylors would have to make 
their own improvements (T. 19, 26, 62, 63). 
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Between December, 1958, an'd July 1, 1959, there were 
a number of meetings between the parties concerning the 
terms of a lease and option to buy (T. 7, 64). The parties 
agreed to a ten-year lease term with an option to buy and 
2greed to a rent figure and other details of the lease and 
option (T. 8, 26, 64, 65, 69, 86, 99). Mrs. Adams set the 
l'ent figure and accepted a check for one-half of the first 
month's rent (T. 19, 23, 26, 62, 64, 75). The Taylors \\·ere 
not required to pay any further rent until they moved in 
(T. 31). It was agreed that Taylors would have their at-
torney draw up a lease. embodying those terms (T. 8, 64). 
Mrs. Adams told the Taylors that if they put a lot of money 
into the place they would have an option to buy. The 
'l'aylors had the premises appraised and made an offer for 
immediate purchase before any lease, which offer was 
rejected (T. 65). 
In the month of May, 1959, Mrs. Adams, Mr. Taylor 
a.nd a surveyor staked out the boundaries of the subject 
premises on the ground, and the surveyor made up a plat 
nnd legal description (T. 15, 16, 30, 106-111, defendants' 
Exhibit 3). Also in May, the draft of a lease was presented 
to the Adamses, but they wanted some changes made and 
would not sign a lease with a ten-year term (T. 27, 45, 67). 
Attempts to meet at the attorney's office and reconcile 
their differences failed because Mr. Adams was sick (T. 
13, 14, 18, 73). As the improvements to the property neared 
completion and the date for ope.ning the drive-in grew 
nearer, the Taylors went to see the Adamses for the pur-
pose of getting something in writing (T. 9, 11, 12, 66, 83). 
The date of this visit was July 1, 1959 (T. 67). The Taylors 
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told the Adamses they had to have something in writing 
before their equipment was put in (T. 66). The parties 
then agreed to a four or five-year lease with an option to 
purchase for $13,000.00 (T. 34, 38, 65·, 66). Mrs. Adams 
wrote on the back of one of the Taylors' checks ( plaintiff's 
Exhibit A) the following words: 
"Selling price $13,000.00 
Four to five Years to buy or lease 
Samuel J. Adams 
Hilda M Adams'' 
Mr. Adams was present when Mrs. Adams signed his name 
to that check (T. 38). 
Under that agreement the Taylors occupied the im-
proved premises and paid rent to the Adamses each month• 
for two years (T. 33). Rent checks were often made pay-
able to both Mr. and Mrs. Adams, and Mrs. Adams accept-
ed the checks and endorsed both names to them (T. 32, 33). 
After two years, the Adamses' attorney drew a lease with 
~;ubstantially different terms than what the parties had 
cgreed to, including trebled rent, and the Taylors were 
requested to sign it (T. 17, 45). They refused, and the 
Adamses attempted to serve them with a document pur-
porting to be a notice to quit (T. 20, 21). The Taylors re-
Inained in the premises, and this lawsuit ensued. 
At the time the Taylors entered into the rent and 
option agreement with the Adamses, the subject premises 
were in a seriously run-down condition. The building had 
been vacant for a year or two (T. 104), although Mrs. Ad-
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ams kept some ceramics in it (T. 40). The toilet bowl and 
wash basin were broken (T. 104). The sewage disposal was 
very inadequate; drainage from the building was running 
out on the surface of the ground (T. 77, 104). The sani-
tarian of the Davis County Health Department had notified 
Layton City not to issue a building or occupancy permit 
for the structure without a clearance from his department 
('r. 104, 105). He had also notified Mr. Adams of the build-
ing's shortcomings (T. 104). The building was a health 
hazard no matter what use it was put to (T. 105). 
Prior to commencing business operations on the prem-
ises, the TaYlors made the following improvements: 
They took out the old broken toilets and basins and 
installed new ones (T.77). 
They tore out the floor in the existing building and 
the plumbing located in it and installed entirely new 
plumbing in the floor, and installed a new floor (T. 78). 
They installed new wiring with all new material (T. 
78, plaintiffs' Exhibit D [letter of May 22, 1959 from Mr. 
Fred Bradshaw] ) . 
They installed a new water system (T. 78). 
They installed a new septic tank and drain field (T. 
78). 
They ran a natural gas line from nearby Angel Street, 
\Vhich is not the street on which the premises are located, 
to the premises ( T. 78). 
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They constructed a 13'6" x 20' addition on the back of 
the existing structure ( T. 79, 97). 
They installed a new roof on the old structure, re-
moving some of the old studding and sheathing and in-
stalling new studding and sheathing (T. 79, 87). 
They blacktopped the surrounding area (T. 83). 
They installed light poles and lights for outside 
lighting (T. 83). 
And they installed an A & W neon sign ( T. 83). 
The value of the improvements to the building and 
premises by the Taylors was approximately $10,500.00 (T. 
84, 95). All of the material and labor which that figure 
represents went into the building (T. 88, 94, 95). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THAT PART OF THE PAR-
'1'IES' VERBAL AGREEMENT WHICH PERTAINED 
TO A LEASE. 
Although the agreement between the parties for a 
lease and option to purchase the premises in question was 
verbal only, and therefore subject to the provisions of the 
Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 
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1953, it was nevertheless enforcable by reason of the com-
panion section, 25-5-8, U.C.A. 1953, which states. "Nothing 
:n this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the 
powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof." The lat-
ter section apparently only restates the. well recognized 
equitable principal that courts will not allow the Statute 
of Frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud by allow-
ing one party to escape performance of his obligations 
under an oral agreement after permitting the other to 
perform in reliance upon the agreement. As the author 
at 49 Am.Jur., Statute of Frauds, Section 422, at Page 727 
has stated: 
The. doctrine of part performance operates not upon 
the theory that the part performance is a substitute 
for the written evidence required by the statute of 
frauds, but on the theory that the defendant may 
be estopped in view of the part performance to as-
sert the statute as a defense. Part performance takes 
the case out of the statute not because it furnishes 
proof of the contract, or because it makes the con-
tract any stronger, but because it would be intoler-
able in equity for the owner of a tract of land 
knowingly to suffer another to invest time, labor, 
and money in that land, upon the- faith of a contract 
which did not exist. 
The court's attention is directed to the unquestioned 
part performance which is present in this case. Beginning 
in July, 1959, the appellants (TaYlors) had possession of 
the premises in dispute here, and every month for twenty-
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four months they operated an A & W drive-in restaurant 
thereon. Every month for twenty-four months they paid 
rent to respo1;1dents (Adamses), and in each of these twen-
ty-four months, respondents accepted the checks. The 
checks were endorsed by Mrs. Adams and were paid in 
the normal course of business. It is submitted that this is 
a very substantial part performance of the lease aspect of 
the parties' agreement. 
But perhaps more important are the extensive im-
provements to the premises which appellants installed 
after the original agreement as to lease terms. The detailed 
items are set forth in the Statement of Facts herein at 
pages 2 through 5 and will not be repeated at this point. 
The only reliable testimony of their total cost was given 
by appellant Mr. Taylor at $10,500.00. Respondents at-
tempted, through the testimony of a retired contractor 
vrho had not been licensed for eight years, to rebut this 
testimony, but on cross-examination that witness, Mr. 
1,ord, testified he did not take into consideration the ma-
joritY of the improvements which appellants had made 
(T. 122, 125). The trial court found that the improvements 
made by appellants were substantial in nature and were 
oi a value in excess of $6,000.00 (R. 61, Finding No.9 ). 
In 1940, this court decided a case, Latses v. Nick 
Ji,loor, Inc., 99 U. 214, 104 P.2d 619, which turned on the 
doctrine of valuable or substantial improvement. The 
language of that decision at 104 P.2d 622 is directly pert-
inent here: 
This court has recognized the principle that im-
provements placed upon premises may take the 
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contract out of the statute of frauds even to the 
extent of requiring a conveYance of the property 
upon an oral agreement. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86. 
86 P. 767, 8. L.R.A., N.S., 870; Hargreaves v. Bur-
ton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 1481. Cer-
tainly if a conveyance may be had upon an oral 
agreement so taken out of the statute, an extension 
of the term of a lease should be granted upon the 
same grounds. Leases have been extended before 
upon such grounds. 33 A.L.R. 1489, 1510; Read 
Drug & Chemical Co. v. Nattans, 129 Md. 67. 98 A. 
158. The Utah cases cited above bring out the fact 
that the improvements must be such as are indica-
tive of something more than repairs that a tenant 
from month to month might make simply for his 
own convenience. Under the lease in question, they 
were to be permanent improvements. 
To the same effect is the text at 49 Am.Jur., Statute of 
Frauds, Section 449, Page 755: 
The making of valuable permanent improvements 
on the land by the purchaser, in pursuance of the 
agreement and with the knowledge of the vendor, 
has been said to be the strongest and most unequi-
vocal act of part performance by which a verbal 
contract to sell land is taken out of the statute of 
frauds, and is ordinarily an improvement element 
in such part performance. It appears that even in 
a comparatively early period of the statute of frauds 
there was coined the apt expression that "a man 
may be improved out of his estate." The rule has 
been laid down in numerous cases that the making 
bY the purchaser of valuable and permanent im-
provements upon land purchased by parol agree-
ment, in reliance upon the agreement, may consti-
tute a sufficient part performance to take the 
contract out of the operation of the statute. The 
view is that where the purchaser upon the faith of 
the contract makes valuable improvements upon 
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the land for which he has not been compensated 
' from the produce and profits of the land, and for 
\Vhich he cannot be adequately compensated in 
damages, a palpable fraud would be perpetrated 
upon him if the vendor were permitted to repud-
iate the contract . 
.ft.nd further in the same section, at Page 7 56: 
Possession by the purchaser under parol contract 
for the purchase of real property, together with his 
making valuable and permanent improvements on 
the property which are referable exclusively to the 
contract, in reliance on the contract, in the honest 
belief that he has a right to make them, and with 
the knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the 
the knowledge and consent or acquiescense of the 
vendor, is deemed a part performance of the 
contract. 
The author of the foregoing text cites a Utah case, Hogan 
v. Swayze, 65 U. 380, 237 P. 1097 (1925). 
Also supporting the above-stated rule is 1 American 
Law of Property, Section 3.21, at Page 219, with respect to 
the landlord-tenant relationship, and Sections 11.7 and 11.9 
vvith respect to the vendor-purchaser relationship. At Sec-
tion 11.9 of the last cited text, the author states: 
Where a purchaser takes possession, under an oral 
agreement for the sale of land or of an interest 
therein, with the consent of the vendor, and, once 
in possession, makes valuable and lasting improve-
ments on the premises in reliance on the contract 
' it has been generally held that there is sufficient 
part performance to take the case out of the Statute 
of Frauds. The improvements must be such that 
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they are referable solely to a contract, and that 
they have been made in reliance upon the promise 
to convey. Thus made, they are usually strong evi-
dence of the existence of a contract and of irrepar-
able injury if the contract is not enforced. 
All of the authors cited thus far have required that 
the improvements relied upon must be referable to the 
<.;ontract, i.e., must have been made in reliance on or in 
performance of the oral contract. To the same effect is 
Corbin on Contracts, Volume 2, Section 434, at Page 495, 
where the author saYs: 
As in the case of possession, the improvements made 
will have small weight unless they are of a kind 
that would not have been made had there been no 
oral contract. They must be "referable to the con-
tract," it is often said. This does not mean that the 
improvements made must have been referred to in 
any way in the contract but only that they are such 
as it would have been improvident to make in the 
absence of some such contract, so that they are 
strong circumstantial evidence of its existence . 
• 
This court has so held in Randall v Tracy Collins Trust 
L'ompany, 6 U.2d 18, 305, P.2d 480 (1956), and In re Mad-
sen's Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DEWIED SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THAT PART OF THE PAR-
TIES' VERBAL AGREEMENT WHICH PERTAINED 
TO AN OPTION TO PURCHASE. 
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The appellants and respondents did not ~nter into two 
contracts. A single consideration - namely, appellants' 
covenant to pay rent - supported both the respondents' 
covenant to give possession of the premises for five years 
under the lease and to sell at the end of the lease period 
for $13,000.00. See Corbin, Volume lA, Section 266, at 
Page 539. The appellants would not have entered into the 
one without the other (T. 86). 
Counsel ackn(nvledges that the authorities cited under 
Point I herein refer both to leases and contracts to sell. It 
is the identity of con/trolling principles in each case which 
illustrates the point here discussed. The option to purchase 
is a contract for the sale of realty. It is inseparably joined 
with the agreement to lease the premises. This seems clear 
from the fact that this was commercial propertY, that it 
\vas in a run-down condition when the appellants took it 
over, that it required substantial improvements of a perm-
anenrt nature in order to make it usable, and that the ap-
pellants in fact made the necessary improvements at con-
siderable expense to themselves. Such improvements are 
not reasonably referable solely to a five-year lease, since 
it would require the sizeable portion of that lease term in 
order to build up a busines, and without an option to 
purchase or an option to renew, the business would be 
lost within a relatively short time. It is not reasonable to 
suppose that it would have been worth the trouble for 
appellants to install those permanent improvements or to 
suppose that they could recover their investment in that 
short a time. 
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The whole history of the parties' negotiations \vith 
reference to their agreement bears out the fact that it was 
one agreement intended to accomplish one purpose. More 
particularly, from an examination of plaintiffs' Exhibit A, 
the check signed on July 1, 1959, at the home of the re-
spondents, there can be no doubt that the respondents 
agreed to a five-year lease with an option to purchase the 
vremises at the end of the five-year lease for the sum of 
$13,000.00. It is submitted that a findin'g by the trial court 
that the one existed is necessarily a finding that the other 
existed, and the finding that both agreements existed is 
the only one supportable by the evidence. 
* * * 
Inasmuch as respondents have cross-appealed, it is 
deemed appropriate at this point to make reference to 
three arguments which have been advanced in the trial 
court. 
First, respondents have argued that because the docu-
Inent. plaintiffs' Exhibit A, signed by Mrs. Adams, makes 
reference to a four or five-Year term, the lease is therefore 
indefinite and cannot be sustained even in the light of 
extensive part performance. The only authority counsel 
has been able to find is to the contrary. 32 Am.Jur., Land-
lord and Tenant, Section 62, at Page 78, states. "A lease 
may be in the alternative for two or more specified periods 
at the option of the lessee without being invalid for want 
of certainty as to the duration of the term; and where it 
is in the alternative for two or more specified periods, 
without stating by whom the period is to be determined, 
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it has been held that the option to determine for which 
period the lease shall continue was given to the lessee, 
and therefore the lease was not invalid for want of certain-
ty as to the term, the reason for this being that the lease 
should be con1strued most favorably to the lessee." The 
text at that point cites Dann v. Spurrier, 3 Bos & P 399, 
127 Eng Reprint 218, 2 Eng Rul Cas 756, 15 Eng Rul Cas 
4b8, which case cites Goodright d. Hall v. Richardson, 
3 T.R. 462 (1789). The Goodright case is cited in 2 Walsh, 
Com1nentaries, Law· of Real Property (1947) Section 140 
at Page 115 in support of the same rule above cited from 
American Jurisprudence. 
Second, respondents have argued that the parties were 
not to be bound by any agreement until a writing had been 
executed by them. With reference to this point, Corbin, 
Volume 1, Section 30, Page 98 says with reference to con-
tracting parties: "If their expressions convince the court 
that they intended to be bound without a formal document, 
their contract is consummated and the expected formal doc-
umenrt will be nothing more than a memorial of that 
contract. In very manY cases the court has been convinced 
that such was the intention and has held the parties bound 
by a contract, even though no document has been execut-
ed." In the same sectioni at Page 105, the author states: 
''Usage and custom may be decisive of the issue. The 
greater the complexity and importance of the transaction, 
the more likely it is that the informal communications 
u.re intended to be preliminary only. The fact that the 
parties contemplate the execution of a document is some 
evidence not in itself conclusive that they intend not to 
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and interpretation of the parties themselves may be de-
cisive on tht' question as to whether a contract has been 
roadc, even though a document was contemplated and has 
never been executed. They may both have already begun 
performance and may have made statements that are 
strongly evidential. Of course, the subsequent conduct of 
the parties may constitute a tacit contract on the terms 
previously agreed upon, even though the understanding 
had at first been that the execution of a formal document 
was necessarY." It is pointed out that the conduct of the 
parties as disclosed by the testimony in the record is that 
they did intend to be bound, even though the understand-
ing had at first been that a formal lease and option agree-
ment would be drawn. 
Thirdly, respondents have contended that Mrs. Adams 
was without authority to enter into the negotiations with 
appellants on behalf of Mr. Adams or to sign anything in 
his behalf. In his testimony Mr. Adams said that Mrs. 
Adams did most of the negotiations, and that she did so 
'vith authority from him (T.49). The prior course of deal-
ing by Mrs. Adams with others in relation to their pro-
perty strongly suggests that she had authority in this 
transaction. It was Mrs. Adams who carried on the conver-
sations with appellants, and it was she who took the draft 
agreement to the local banker for his opinion on it. It was 
she who showed Mr. Fifield where the boundary pegs 
should go. It was she who signed the back of the check, 
plaintiffs' Exhibit A, in the presence of Mr. Adams without 
his protest, and it was she who leased the property prev-
iously to Mr. Bench. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, the evidence is clear and convincing that 
appellants: and respondents entered into a verbal lease and 
option to purchase agreement which was certain in its 
terms, which was entered into by both parties and partly 
performed, and which should now be enforced by a court 
of equity. Accordingly, the holding of the trial court grant-
ing specific performance of the parties' agreement as to 
lease of the premises in question should be affirmed, and 
the holding denying specific performance of appellants' 
option to purchase said premises should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEAN AND BEAN 
K. Roger Bean 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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